Viernes Económico | Accountability, Political Capture and Selection into Politics: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities. 21 de junio, 2.30 p.m.

Día: Viernes 21 de junio

Hora: 2:30 p.m.

Lugar: Sala de Grados de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales


Resumen del paper a presentar:

Accountability, Political Capture and Selection into Politics:Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities*

Miriam ArtillesUniversitat Pompeu Fabra& Barcelona GSE & IPEG

Lukas Kleine-RueschkampOECD

Gianmarco León-CiliottaUniversitat Pompeu Fabra& Barcelona GSE & IPEG & CEPR

We estimate the effects of political accountability on the selection of politicians whenaccountability mechanisms are prone to political capture. Using a comprehensive datasetthat records characteristics of candidates for mayor in the last three local elections inPerú, and a close election sharp regression discontinuity design, we compare candidatesrunning for mayor in districts where the incumbent was ousted from office through a recallreferendum in the previous electoral term with those who run in districts where the recallreferendum failed by a small margin. Candidates in municipalities where the incumbentwas recalled are less educated, have less experience in elected offices and in the publicsector, and are younger. These findings are consistent with a framework where potentialcandidates learn about an accountability mechanism which is prone to capture, distort-ing the main objectives of improving the quality of government, and instead discouraginghigh quality candidates to run. The negative selection of candidates is partially offset byvoters, who elect the best politician out of a lower quality pool of candidates.




Associate Professor at the department of Economics and Business at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and at IPEG-Barcelona, and a Research Affiliate at CEPR. Current research interest is focused in three broad areas of development and political economics: (i) understanding voter behavior, i.e. turnout decisions and candidate choices, (ii) study of the selection and incentive mechanisms for public sector workers; and (iii) the effects of shocks (i.e. civil conflict, pollution) on human capital accumulation.